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Justification by Infinite Loops
David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg
Abstract In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-
defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear
chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification
takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop
tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-
defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear chain. This suggests
that infinitism sits more comfortably with a coherentist view of justification than
with an approach in which justification is portrayed as a linear process.
1 Introduction
Present-day epistemologists routinely assume that justification is probabilistic in
character: a proposition En may be justified by another proposition En+1, even if
the latter only partially supports the former. Recently we have shown that this ap-
parently innocent assumption flies in the face of classical foundationalism [1]. For if
we take seriously that justification comes in degrees, then there is in general no need
for a foundation from which the justification springs. The target proposition En may
have a perfectly well-defined probability value, even though its support consists of
an infinite linear chain in which En is probabilistically justified by En+1, which in
turn is probabilistically justified by En+2, and so on, ad infinitum.1
In the present paper we extend this research on infinite linear chains by exploring
the viability of infinite epistemic loops. We show that, once justification is inter-
preted probabilistically, the prospects for infinite loops are even brighter than those
for infinite linear chains. If a proposition is justified by an infinite loop, it always has
a well-defined unconditional probability, whereas this is not always so for infinite
linear chains. An infinite linear chain normally confers upon the target proposition
an unconditional probability that is well-defined, but there are exceptional cases in
which it fails to do so.
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Here is how we plan to make our case. In Section 2 we start with a discussion of
finite and infinite linear probabilistic chains, briefly summarizing the results that we
derived in [1]. We explain that infinite linear probabilistic chains always converge
and that they normally yield a well-defined probability value for the target proposi-
tion. In addition to the results in [1], we also delineate a class of exceptional cases, in
which the target proposition lacks a unique value. After this analysis of justification
by probabilistic chains, we turn our attention to justification by probabilistic loops.
We first discuss in Section 3 loops that are finite, describing and analyzing several
examples. We show that justification by a finite loop is often nontrivial, yielding a
definite value for the target proposition where we would not immediately expect it.
In Section 4 we extend our study to loops of infinite size. We demonstrate that jus-
tification by an infinite linear chain is usually indistinguishable from justification by
an infinite loop. The only cases in which an infinite chain and an infinite loop differ
are the exceptional situations that we had already identified in Section 2. In those
situations, the infinite loop does, whereas the infinite chain does not yield a well-
defined unconditional probability for the target proposition. Finally, in Section 5, we
sum up our results.
2 Finite and Infinite Linear Chains
Let E0, E1, E2, . . . be a sequence of propositions, finite or infinite in number. We
say that En is probabilistically justified by En+1 if and only if the conditional prob-
ability of En , given that En+1 is true, is greater than the conditional probability of
En , given that En+1 is false:
P(En|En+1) > P(En|¬En+1) . (1)
The unconditional probabilities P(En) and P(En+1) are related by the rule of total
probability,
P(En) = P(En|En+1)P(En+1)+ P(En|¬En+1)[1− P(En+1)] . (2)
With the abbreviations
αn = P(En|En+1) ,
βn = P(En|¬En+1) ,
γn = αn − βn ,
rule (2) becomes
P(En) = βn + γnP(En+1) . (3)
Clearly, γn > 0 is equivalent to the condition of probabilistic support as expressed
in (1).
If each member of the sequence E0, E1, E2, . . . , Es+1, except Es+1, is proba-
bilistically justified by its successor, we speak of a finite linear chain of probabilistic
support. The linear chain is then grounded in the ultimate link Es+1, which is unsup-
ported by any of the other links. We can consider a finite chain in which the number
of links, s+1, is fixed, for example when there are just three of them, or we might be
interested in a situation in which the length of the finite chain is allowed to vary, thus
turning s into a variable. In both cases we must find some reason for the veridicality
or plausibility of Es+1, on pain of leaving the entire chain hanging in the air.
Equation (3) can be iterated from n = 0 up to n = s, with the result
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + · · · + γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs + γ0γ1 . . . γs P(Es+1) . (4)
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Equation (4) is the most general formulation of a finite linear chain.2 It applies not
only to cases where both αn and βn are uniform, that is, where they remain constant
from one link to the next throughout the chain, but also to cases where both αn and
βn are nonuniform, taking on different values that depend on n. In [1] three examples
were given of a finite linear chain with variable s: one in which αn and βn do not
depend on n, one in which they do depend on n although γn does not, and finally one
in which αn , βn , and γn all depend on n.
The structure of (4) can be represented as
P(E0) = X + Y Z , (5)
where X is a finite sum of conditional probabilities only and Y Z is a remainder
term. The factor Y is the finite product of γ factors, while Z is the unconditional
probability of the alleged ground of the chain, Es+1:
X = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + · · · + γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs
Y = γ0γ1 . . . γs
Z = P(Es+1) . (6)
In the limit that s goes to infinity, all the members of the sequence E0, E1, E2, . . .
are probabilistically justified by their successors. In this case the chain of support is
infinite and its structure becomes
P(E0) = X ′ + Y ′Z ′ , (7)
where X ′, Y ′, and Z ′ are
X ′ = lim
s→∞{β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + · · · + γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs}
Y ′ = lim
s→∞{γ0γ1 . . . γs}
Z ′ = lim
s→∞ P(Es+1) . (8)
We have proved that X ′ always converges to a unique and well-defined number ([2],
Appendix A). In addition, we showed that Y ′ usually tends to zero ([2], Appendix B).
This means that, in general, the product Y ′Z ′ vanishes and thus that, as a rule, P(E0)
in (7) takes on the well-defined value X ′. It is only in very exceptional cases that Y ′
does not tend to zero, and then the value of P(E0) cannot be determined (see the Ap-
pendix of the present paper for the condition under which this happens). Surprisingly
enough, even in these exceptional cases the value of P(E0) can still be determined
if the probabilistic justification has the form of an infinite loop rather than an infinite
linear chain. We will come back to this point in Section 4, where we discuss justi-
fication by infinite loops. First, in Section 3, we consider loops of finite size. We
show that justification by a finite probabilistic loop is nontrivial in most cases. For
usually the conditional probabilities on the loop vary, and then the value of P(E0) is
a nontrivial function of the length of the loop.
3 Finite Loops
We have seen that Equation (4) is the general formulation of a finite linear chain.
The general formulation of a finite loop has a similar form, but for some finite s it
410 Atkinson and Peijnenburg
is so that Es+1 = E0. Mathematically, there is no problem whatsoever if we insert
Es+1 = E0 into Equation (4):
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + · · · + γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs + γ0γ1 . . . γs P(E0), (9)
for this yields
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + · · · + γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs1− γ0γ1 . . . γs , (10)
which is well-defined, on condition that γ0γ1 . . . γs is not equal to unity.3 With that
proviso, the solution furnishes a generic justification of the viability of the coherentist
scenario in its simplest form, that of a finite one-dimensional ring.
So mathematically speaking a self-supporting finite loop or ring is certainly pos-
sible. But the fact that something makes good mathematical sense is, of course, not
enough. Can a loop that closes upon itself really occur? A temporal example of
such a loop is difficult to come by in the real world, but the science fiction of time
travel can provide one. E0 could be the event that young Bif decides in 1958 to use
the 2018 edition of the sports almanac, E1 the event that he continues his successful
career as bettor until 2018, and E2 the event that old Bif succeeds in stealing Doc
Brown’s time machine in 2018, returning to 1958 in order to give the almanac to his
younger self. E3 = E0 could be the event that young Bif decides in 1958 to use the
2018 edition of the sports almanac. . . and so on.
However, the events need not follow one another in time. For example, consider
the following three propositions:
C: “Peter read parts of the Critique of Pure Reason.”
P: “Peter is a philosopher.”
S: “Peter knows that Kant defended the synthetic a priori.”
Assuming that all philosophers read at least parts of the Critique of Pure Reason
as undergraduates, if Peter is a philosopher, then he read parts of the Critique. Of
course, even if he is not a philosopher, he may still have read Kant’s magnum opus. If
Peter knows that Kant defended the synthetic a priori, he very likely is a philosopher,
whereas if he does not, he is probably not a philosopher, although of course he might
be an exceptionally incompetent one, not having understood anything of Kant or the
Critique. Finally, if he read the Critique, he quite likely knows that Kant defended
the synthetic a priori, whereas this is rather less likely if he never opened the book.
Here then is a simple finite loop, consisting of a fixed number of links, namely three:
C←− P←− S←− C , (11)
where the arrow indicates that the proposition at the right-hand side probabilistically
justifies the one at the left.
We can make loop (11) nonuniform by investing the three propositions C, P, and
S with, for example, the following dissimilar values for the the conditional probabil-
ities:
C: α0 = P(C |P) = 1 ; β0 = P(C |¬P) = 110 ; γ0 = α0 − β0 = 910
P: α1 = P(P |S ) = 910 ; β1 = P(P |¬S ) = 15 ; γ1 = α1 − β1 = 710
S: α2 = P(S |C ) = 45 ; β2 = P(S |¬C ) = 25 ; γ2 = α2 − β2 = 25 .
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Then the unconditional probabilities4 are
P(C ) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2
1− γ0γ1γ2 = 0.711
P(P ) = β1 + γ1β2 + γ1γ2β0
1− γ0γ1γ2 = 0.679
P(S ) = β2 + γ2β0 + γ2γ0β1
1− γ0γ1γ2 = 0.684 .
The number of links in the above nonuniform loop is fixed—there are exactly three
propositions. Often, however, we are dealing with cases in which there is a variable s.
Let us therefore look at an example of a nonuniform loop in which the number of
links varies. We will see that, in this example, the value of P(E0) depends on the
length of the loop in a nontrivial way. Consider
βn = 1n + 3 γn =
n + 1
n + 2 = 1−
1
n + 2 . (12)
Then
γ0γ1 . . . γs = 12 × 23 × · · · × ss+1 × s+1s+2 = 1s+2
γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs = 1s+1 × 1s+3 = 12 ( 1s+1 − 1s+3 ) ,
so Equation (10) reduces to
P(E0) =
1
3 + 12 ( 12 − 14 )+ 12 ( 13 − 15 )+ · · · 12 ( 1s+1 − 1s+3 )
1− 1s+2

















= 3s + 8
4(s + 3) . (13)
Here P(E0) does depend on the number of sites on the finite loop (and, more-
over, there is a definite limit as the number of sites tends to infinity, namely 34 ).
What is more, since in this example the conditional probabilities, P(En|En+1) and
P(En|¬En+1), are not the same for different n, the unconditional probabilities,
P(En), also are not the same for different n. In fact, one finds
P(En) = 1− 12
1




s + 3 , (14)
which indeed depends nontrivially on n, as well as on s, the length of the loop.5
Cases like (13), in which the value of P(E0) varies with the number of links, form
in fact the generic situation. There also exist special cases, where the value of P(E0)
does not depend on s. Such nongeneric cases arise when the conditional probabilities
are uniform (that is, all the βn are the same, and all the γn are the same, independent
of n). Intuitively, it is clear that loops for which the conditional probabilities are
uniform will yield unconditional probabilities that are independent of s. Here is a
formal proof. In the uniform case, Equation (10) becomes
P(E0) = β(1+ γ + γ
2 + · · · γ s)
1− γ s+1 . (15)
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The finite geometrical series 1 + γ + γ 2 + · · · γ s is equal to (1 − γ s+1)/(1 − γ ),
and on substituting this we find
P(E0) = β1− γ . (16)
Indeed, this does not depend on s at all. The value of P(E0) is the same, irrespective
of s, that is, however long or short the loop may be. Moreover, in this uniform case
P(E0), P(E1), P(E2), and so on, are all equal, since they are all determined by
the same cyclic expression (15). The number of links is completely irrelevant to the
value of the unconditional probabilities in the uniform case; moreover, this holds
whether s is finite or infinite.
4 Infinite Loops
We consider now an infinite loop of probabilistic support, that is, one where s in (9)
and (10) goes to infinity. We first look at what happens when the product γ0γ1 . . . γs
tends to zero as s goes to infinity, and then what happens when it doesn’t. The former
represents the typical case, the latter the atypical one.
If γ0γ1 . . . γs tends to zero, (10) yields the infinite series
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + γ0γ1γ2β3 . . . (17)
and we have seen that such an infinite series is always convergent. In fact, Equa-
tion (17) is what one obtains by letting s in Equation (4) go to infinity. So in the
typical case there is no difference between the infinite chain and the infinite loop.
The above equation covers both the uniform and the nonuniform cases. In the
uniform infinite situation, in which βn and γn are constant, that is, independent of n,
Equation (17) reduces to
P(E0) = β(1+ γ + γ 2 + . . . ) = β1− γ . (18)
This infinite uniform loop yields the same unconditional probability as does the finite
uniform loop, a fact that is intuitively easy to grasp. After all, in the latter case,
propositions are uniformly connected round and round ad infinitum.
The nonuniform case is more interesting. Here (17) can take many different
forms, dependent on the values of βn and γn . If we choose for these values the
ones that were given in (12), then we obtain the expression (14) in the limit that s is
taken to infinity, namely,
P(En) = 1− 12
1
n + 2 =
2n + 3
2(n + 2) . (19)
In particular, P(E0) = 34 , as we have already noted—see (13) and the lines following
that equation.
So much for the typical case. What of the atypical situation in which the infinite
product of the γs is not zero? Here the linear chain fails, in the infinite limit, to
produce a definite answer for the probability, whereas the infinite loop gives a unique
value. To illustrate this, consider the specific example
βn = 1
(n + 2)(n + 3) γn =
(n + 1)(n + 3)
(n + 2)2 = 1−
1
(n + 2)2 .
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The crucial difference is that here 1 − γn tends to zero as fast as 1/n2, whereas this
difference had the slower asymptotic behavior 1/n in Equation (12). We find now
γ0γ1 . . . γs = [ 12 · 32 ] × [ 23 · 43 ] × · · · × [ s+1s+2 · s+3s+2 ] = 12 s+3s+2
γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs = 12 s+2s+1 × 1(s+2)(s+3) = 14 ( 1s+1 − 1s+3 ) ,
so Equation (4) becomes
P(E0) = 16 − 14 ( 12 − 14 + 13 − 15 + 14 − 16 + · · · +
1














s + 2 P(Es+1) . (20)
Note that the coefficient in front of P(Es+1) does not vanish in the limit that s tends
to infinity. Indeed, in this limit we find formally




where P(E∞) is an indeterminate number in the interval [0, 1]. The infinite linear
chain has in this case failed to produce a definite value for the probability. However,
for the infinite loop we can set P(Es+1) = P(E0) in Equation (20) and then we can
















s + 3 ,
which has the perfectly definite limit 34 . Thus, the infinite chain and the infinite
ring only differ when γs tends to unity with sufficient rapidity. In the Appendix
we formulate a necessary and sufficient condition under which this happens, thus
delineating the entire class of cases in which the infinite chain fails to give a definite
answer, but the infinite loop does so.
5 A Pluralistic Picture
In 1956 Sellars diagnosed the malaise of epistemology as an unpalatable either/or:
“One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a
tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of
knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do” ([3],
p. 300). Sellars was presumably thinking of chains and loops, both involving en-
tailment relations only, and then indeed neither is adequate. However, if support is
interpreted probabilistically, then we are not confined to these two possibilities. For
then a picture of justification emerges that is distinctly pluralistic. A target propo-
sition, En , can be probabilistically justified by a finite or an infinite chain, or it can
be justified by a finite or an infinite loop. In each of these four cases the conditional
probabilities might be uniform or they might be nonuniform. These three parameters
(finite versus infinite chain, finite versus infinite loop, uniform versus nonuniform)
thus yield eight different varieties of probabilistic support.
The main result of our paper pertains to probabilistic support that is nonuniform
and infinite. At first sight one might think that a nonuniform loop of infinite length
cannot really be called a loop, since there is no end of the tail that the Hegelian
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serpent can swallow. After all, is it not the case that a Wiederkehr des Gleichen, to
quote another German philosopher, must require that the loop be finite? The loop
may be long, indeed more than cosmologically long, but it seems that it may not be
infinite, on pain of having no Wiederkehr at all. Moreover, even Poincaré, when he
formulated his recurrence theorem, had to assume that the universe is finite in spatial
extent and of finite energy: those are necessary conditions for a recurrence in finite
time.
So it seems that a real loop differs from an infinite “loop.” However, from this
it does not follow that, therefore, an infinite loop is in fact an infinite chain. Our
investigation shows that such a conclusion would be unwarranted. It is true that an
infinite uniform loop cannot be distinguished from an infinite uniform chain: both
yield the same trivial result. It is also true that, usually, the infinite nonuniform loop
produces the same value as does the infinite nonuniform chain. However, there are
exceptional situations in which infinite nonuniform loops and infinite nonuniform
chains yield different results. These exceptions consist in cases where the infinitely
far away “end” of the chain can still exert some influence on the probability of the
target proposition. As we have shown, an infinite loop has an even wider domain
than does an infinite linear chain: an infinitely long serpent succeeds even when an
infinite stack of tortoises fails.
Appendix
What is the general condition under which the infinite linear chain and the infinite
loop fail to agree? Clearly if γ0γ1 . . . γs does not vanish in the limit of infinite s.
Every γn lies in the open interval (0, 1), the extreme values 0 and 1 being excluded
by fiat. Since γn = exp[ log γn] = exp[−| log γn| ], we have








| log γs |
]
.




| log γs | (21)
is convergent. Clearly, convergence can occur only if γs tends sufficiently quickly
to 1. For example, if
γs ∼ 1− s−a
for large s, then Equation (21) converges if a > 1, and in that case the coherentist
loop (10) yields
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + . . .1− e−σ ,
but the linear infinitist chain instead gives
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + · · · + e−σ P(E∞) .
Whereas the infinite loop gives a definite answer in terms of all the conditional prob-
abilities, the linear chain is problematic in the infinite limit, for P(E∞) must be
construed as an indeterminate number between 0 and 1.
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Notes
1. For a more extensive discussion of how patterns of probabilistic dependence are relevant
to an understanding of epistemic justification, see our earlier paper [1]. The present article
may be regarded as a sequel to that work.
2. Equation (4) is the same as Equation (13) in [1].
3. If γ0γ1 . . . γs = 1, it follows that all the γs are separately equal to one. But then all the
αs are equal to one also, and all the βs are equal to zero, which is the condition of bi-
implication. It is clear logically that the propositions could all be true, or all be false, for
these two extreme possibilities are obviously consistent with the bi-implication. However,
the lack of uniqueness goes further, for any probability between 0 and 1, if it is shared by
all the propositions, is consistent with bi-implication. This is a direct consequence of the
rule of total probability when α = 1 and β = 0. So if the product of the γs is unity, the
indeterminacy is maximal, and if it is not unity, then the unconditional probabilities are
determined uniquely.
4. As they must, these numbers satisfy
P(C ) = β0 + γ0P(P ) P(P ) = β1 + γ1P(S ) P(S ) = β2 + γ2P(C ) .
Incidentally, there is a good reason for considering a loop of at least three propositions.
For in a “loop” of just two links, there are only three independent unconditional proba-
bilities, for example P(E0), P(E1), and P(E0 ∧ E1), whereas there are four conditional
probabilities around the loop, P(E0|E1), P(E0|¬E1), P(E1|E0), and P(E1|¬E0). So
there must be a linear relation between them, which means that all four may not be chosen
independently. This difficulty does not arise for a loop of three links, for in this case there
are seven independent unconditional probabilities and only six conditional probabilities
around the loop, so the latter may be chosen arbitrarily. With more than three links on
the loop there is even more freedom, so the conditional probabilities may again be chosen
freely.
5. For a general value of m between 0 and s, we see by iteration of Equation (3) from
n = m to n = s that P(Em) = βm + γmβm+1 + · · · + γm . . . γs−1βs + γm . . .
γs P(Es+1). Much as in the case m = 0, we find γm . . . γs = m+1s+2 and






With these expressions in hand, we work through steps entirely analogous to those given
in (13), ending with formula (14).
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